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* STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Does the law of Utah recognize that under certain 
circumstances a contract for employment, of indefinite duration 
will give rise to implied covenants of good faith and fair dealing. 
2. Is the covenant of good faith and fair dealing (inherent 
in other contracts under Utah law) inherent in an at-will employer-
employee relationship where a policy and procedure manual exists. 
3. Does a policy and procedure manual governing employer and 
employee relationships create an express or implied contract of 
employment such as to create a cause of action should the terms 
of the manual not be followed; 
4. Does the defense of qualified privilege exist under 
the facts and circumstances of this case so as to justify dismissal 
of a defamation claim. 
5. Did the District Court err in partially dismissing 
plaintiffs1 claim for breach of contract and in dismissing 
plaintiffs1 claim for defamation. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal of a jury verdict awarding monetary damages 
for plaintiffs and against defendant Nordstrom. A cross appeal 
was also filed by plaintiffs from the partial dismissal by the 
trial court of their breach of contract claims and the dismissal 
of their defamation claims. 
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II. DISPOSITION BY THE LOWER COURT 
Following a jury trial held from January 14 through January 
30, 198 5, the jury awarded judgment on special interrogatories 
in favor of the plaintiff Dennis Knapp in the sum of $150,000, in 
favor of the plaintiff Barbara Knapp in the sum of $80,000 and in 
favor of the plaintiff Cathy Brehany in the sum of $50,000. 
R. C82-5828, 538. At the conclusion of the case and prior to its 
submission to the jury, the district court dismissed plaintiffs1 
cause of action claiming defamation and partially dismissed plaintiffs1 
cause of action claiming breach of contract. T. 2319-2321. The 
district court subsequently denied defendant's Motion for Summary * 
Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict, New Trial or Remittitur. 
T. 2467-68. This appeal and cross appeal followed. R. 82-5828 
2475-76, 2478-79. < 
III. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiffs Dennis Knapp, Barbara Knapp and Cathy Brehany 
were employees of defendant at its Crossroad Plaza Store in Salt ( 
Lake City, Utah. Dennis Knapp had been employed by defendant since 
July 1973. T. 954. Barbara Knapp had been employed by defendant 
since October 1975 and Cathy Brehany was employed by Nordstrom ( 
but the exact date is unclear from the record. T. 1152-53. 
At the time each of the plaintiffs was hired each was given 
and required to sign a Manual entitled Nordstrom History, Policy | 
and Regulations. (Ex.P-1) T. 957-959, T. 1153, 1274-1275. The 
manual provides for a set of rules and describes the conduct expected 
of employees. It provided for a procedure for termination of | 
employees and stated in part: 
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"The following offenses may result in immediate dismissal: 
5. Unbecoming conduct bringing reflection or criticism 
upon the store and its personnel, malicious mischief, neglect 
or carelessness resulting in injury to individuals or destruction 
of store or other property. 
8. Introduction, possession, or use of habit forming drugs, 
hallucinogens, illegal narcotics or intoxicating liquors on the 
property of the store or reporting for duty under the influence 
of same. This includes use or consumption during breaks, lunch 
period or prior to reporting for work." 
A total of eleven grounds are stated as offenses which may 
result in immediate termination, pp. 23-24 of Ex.P-1. 
Ex.P-1 further provides: 
"REGULATIONS PROTECTING YOU AND YOUR STORE" (Emphasis Added) 
"In organizations of our size, there must be rules to maintain 
harmony and prevent injustice. (Emphasis Added) Nordstrom has as 
few rules as possible, but they are strictly enforced in fairness 
to the group as a whole. 
The following may result in discharge after a written warning..." 
Nine categories of offenses are then listed. On July 21, 
1981 defendant terminated the employment of all three plaintiffs. 
Plaintiff Dennis Knapp was fired for using drugs. T. 999-1000. 
Plaintiff Barbara Knapp was fired because she was the wife of 
Dennis Knapp. T. 1298, 1300. Cathy Brehany was fired for supplying 
drugs to employees. T. 1143. 
After the firing of plaintiffs, agents of defendants advised 
others who asked what they should tell other employees about the 
termination, to tell them the plaintiffs were fired because they 
were involved in drugs or narcotics. T. 1140, 1331, 1337, 1338, 1353, 
1360, 1367, 1372-77, 1392-99, 1403-07. 
The defendant claims that the events leading up to the 
termination of plaintiffs began with an internal investigation. 
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In fact, no real investigation was done. The defendant's agents 
relied upon rumor, innuendo, hearsay and speculation in terminating 
the plaintiffs. T. 1560-68. 
Of particular import is Mary Tasa's description of the birth-
day party at Michael Soul's home where drugs were allegedly used. 
Tasa never stated that either Dennis, Barbara or Cathy were present. 
T. 1565. In fact, there was testimony that none of the plaintiffs 
in fact attended that party. T. 945-48, 1327-33. 
Counsel for defendant-appellant on page 6-9 refers this court 
to many transcript citations in an effort to show the careful 
investigation conducted by defendant's agents and offices. Plaintiffs-
respondents adopt these citations as evidence that the investigation 
was one of rumor, hearsay, innuendo and suspicion. In fact, a 
careful review of all the evidence offered at trial shows that no 
real investigation into the allegations involving the plaintiffs 
was ever made by anyone on behalf of the defendant. 
i 
The jury heard all of the evidence and under the instructions 
given to it by the court and using the special interrogatories 
form of verdict submitted to it concluded that the defendant did 
< 
not act in good faith in terminating the employment of plaintiffs. 
C-82-5828, 538. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
i 
1. This case should be affirmed insofar as the jury verdict 
awarding plaintiffs damages for breach of an implied covenent of 
good faith and fair dealing. The court should follow the majority 
4 
of cases which have accepted the doctrine of good faith and fair 
dealing as a contractual obligation growing out of the contract 
-4-
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especially where as here there is a policy and procedure manual 
dictating the rights of the parties. 
(a) The evidence was sufficient to justify the verdict; 
(b) The issue of breach of implied warranty was properly 
raised; 
(c) The jury instructions given were proper; 
(d) Bad faith was adequately defined in the jury instructions; 
(e) No remittitur should be granted. 
2. That portion of the district court's judgment partially 
dismissing plaintiffs1 claimed breach of contract should be reviewed 
and the case remanded for a new trial since an express or implied 
contract existed by virtue of the policy and procedure manual signed 
on behalf of each plaintiff. 
3. That portion of the district court's judgment dismissing 
plaintiffs' claim for defamation should be reversed and the case 
remanded for trial since a qualified privilege did not exist 
under the circumstances of this case. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE UTAH SUPREME COURT SHOULD AFFIRM THE JURY VERDICT IN 
FAVOR OF THE PLAINTIFFS AND AGAINST THE DEFENDANT. 
The judgment of the jury in favor of plaintiffs is not in 
error and should be affirmed. Plaintiffs were not at-will employees 
of Nordstrom, such that they could be fired for any reason. Utah 
law should recognize a claim for breach of an implied covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing. There was adequate evidence to 
substantiate and justify the jury verdict. A claim for relief for 
breach of an implied convenant of good faith and fair dealing was 
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pled and properly presented to the jury. 
A. The Circumstances Surrounding Plaintiffs1 Employment and 
The Method Employed By Defendant In Firing Them Created 
A Cause Of Action Under Which Plaintiffs Are Entitled 
To Recover Damages. 
The Supreme Court of Utah has never decided a case directly 
on point with the case at bar. A careful analysis of the two leading 
Utah cases in this area leads to the conclusion that Utah does 
recognize that under certain circumstances, a contract for employment, 
of indefinite duration, will give rise to implied covenants to not 
discharge except for cause and in good faith. 
In Bihlmaier v. Carson, 603 P. 2d 790 (Utah 1979) the plaintiff 
sued for breach of an oral employment contract with defendant, who 
founded and operated a small grocery store. Carson, because of his 
age and desire to spend more leisure time, sought a qualified person 
to become acting manager of his store. Plaintiff and defendant 
engaged in "extended negotiations" before plaintiff left his previous 
job in California to take the managerial position. 
In was undisputed in Bihlmaier that the employment was being 
conducted on a trial basis only, and that plaintiff's continued 
employment and assumption of complete managerial duties was condition-
al upon the plaintiff's performance during a "trial period". 
Shortly after arriving in Utah, and starting his employment, 
plaintiff Bihlmaier sought a loan to buy a house. The loan was 
refused because the employer answered a question on the loan application 
form, as to the probability of plaintiff's continued employment as 
follows: "continued employment depends upon applicant hired on 
i 
a trial basis only." j..-. 
- 6 - • 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
The plaintiff considered this to be a constructive discharge 
and a breach of the oral employment contract, and thereafter 
plaintiff terminated his employment and brought suit. 
The Supreme Court affirmed a summary judgment in favor of the 
defendant employer, noting: 
"Under the facts as presented in the depositions of the 
two parties, the final oral employment contract cont-
ained no express terms concerning the duration of the 
plaintiff's employment. Rather, the evidence indicates 
that both parties intended the employment to be 
indefinite and terminable at the will of either party. 
The plaintiff explained in his deposition: 
Q. Was there any agreement as to how long you 
would be employed with Mr. Carson? 
A. Other than I was hired as a store manager, no, 
no specific time. 
Q. There was no specific time at all, was there? 
A. No. That is correct. 
*** 
Q. So you did understand and agree that your 
employment was for no definite period of 
time and might be terminated at any time 
without previous notice. Isn't that right? 
A. Yes, I think that's fair, ... 
The general rule concerning personal employment contracts 
is, in the absence of some further express or implied 
stipulation as to the duration of the employment or of 
a good consideration in addition to the services contracted 
to be rendered, the contract is no more than an indefinite 
general hiring which is terminable at the will of either 
party. The evidence presented in support of the summary 
judgment motion shows this was the express intent and 
understanding of the contracting parties." (603 P. 2d at 
792, emphasis supplied.) 
It is clear from the emphasized portion of the opinion quoted 
above that this court specifically recognized that if there is an 
express or implied stipulation as to the duration of the employment 
then the contract is not terminable at will. Clearly the evidence 
in Bihlmaier was that the contract could be terminated anytime. 
Yet, the court in its decision does not confine itself to these 
facts but observed that if there is an express or implied stipulation 
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as to duration then termination at will does not apply. 
In Piacitelli v. Southern Utah State College, 636 P. 2d 
1063 (Utah 1981), the plaintiff had been employed by the defendant 
College since 1973, as Coordinator of Counselling. His position 
was "classified staff" non-faculty, and not eligible for tenure. 
Every academic year from 1973 to 1978, he was issued a Notice of 
Appointment, signed by the college president, and "effective for the 
contract period of July 1 through June 30". This Notice set forth 
his job title, salary, and department. Each year, he would sign 
and return a form indicating his acceptance of employment as specified 
in the Notice. 
Early on in his employment, the plaintiff had numerous disputes 
with his supervisors. Some of these were never resolved. In December 
of 19 78, plaintiff's immediate supervisor recommended that the college 
not continue to employ plaintiff. 
The college president sent plaintiff a one sentence letter 
dated January 24, 1979, indicating his contract would "not be 
renewed at the end of the contract period." Plaintiff was later 
advised by a second letter from the president dated February 13, 
1979 that the college's action was "not to be interpreted as dismissal ' 
for cause" which action if taken, would result in immediate termination 
of employment. A later affidavit from the dean of students indicated 
non-renewal, rather than dismissal for cause, was used "out of * 
consideration for [plaintiff's] professional future and in accordance 
with higher education practices." 
The plaintiff sued, alleging the failure to renew the employment I 
contract was, in effect, a dismissal for cause, and violated his 
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due process rights, as set out by the SUSC Personnel Policies 
and Procedures, Plaintiff argued that the collegefs Personnel 
Policies and Procedures Manual (hereinafter manual) controlled 
the case. 
The manual suggested that classified employees were either 
probationary, hence "terminable at will" or permanent, hence 
"terminable only after compliance with specified procedures." 
Plaintiff argued the college' s action of not renewing his contract 
was an attempt to avoid its own procedures, and do indirectly what 
its own manual would not allow directly. 
The college agreed that plaintiff was not probationary, but 
contended that since he was employed on a year to year basis, and 
his contract had expired by its own terms, he was not dismissed at 
all, rather, he was merely not rehired. Therefore, the termination 
procedures did not apply. The Supreme Court noted: 
"In January, 19 80, the district court ruled that the 
college's Personnel Manual governed the terms of 
Piacitelli's employment contract with the college, 
that Piacitelli had acquired fpermanent employment 
status1 under that contract, and that the college's 
failure to renew Piacitelli's annual employment 
contract without complying 'with due process of law 
requirements pursuant to [the Personnel Manual]... 
constituted plaintiff's termination and thus a breach 
of contract.' The district court thereupon ordered 
the college to grant Piacitelli 'administrative due 
process procedure pursuant to the [Personnel Manual]'. 
This was a final order, which, unless reversed on 
appeal, is res judicata and binding upon these parties. 
**** 
The order was not appealed. Consequently, for purposes 
of this case, we must treat Piacitelli as an employee 
with permanent employment status whose employment 
contract entitled him to the formal procedures specified 
in the Personnel Manual before he could be dismissed or 
terminated, even at the conclusion of the annual contract 
period." (636 P. 2d at 1065, citations omitted.) 
-9-
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Thereafter, the college issued a formal notice of dismissal. 
The plaintiff appealed through three separate levels of college 
authorities. All upheld the dismissal. The plaintiff then returned 
to the district court, which ruled that the college had substantially 
complied with its procedures, and that the termination was sound, 
and that no grounds existed to reinstate plaintiff. Plaintiff was 
awarded back pay for the period from when his contract expired until 
the proper termination was effected. 
The plaintiff's sole issue on appeal was that the college 
had not adequately complied with the contractual termination pro-
cedures contained in the manual. The Supreme Court held that the 
college had substantially complied with the procedures, and substantial 
compliance was sufficient, because this satisfied the substantial 
interests of the parties, so that the employment contract was not 
breached. 
The college had cross-appealed the award of back pay, present-
ing the issue, 
"Is a college employee who was dismissed with sufficient 
cause, but in violation of contractually guaranteed 
termination procedures, entitled as a matter of contract 
law to back pay for the period between the procedurally < 
defective dismissal and the subsequent proper dismissal?" 
(636 P. 2d at 1067) 
The Supreme Court held such an employee was entitled to back 
pay as a matter of contract law. The Court distinguished the i 
contract claim from the type of claim found in an action based upon 
deprivation of constitutional rights, which sound in tort, and 
which routinely do not allow for recovery of back wages where, < 
although due process if followed, good cause nevertheless exists 
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for the discharge. 
"This outcome contrasts with the outcome produced by 
analyzing the same problems from the standpoint of 
breach of contract. By entering into an employment 
contract of the type before us, the parties assume 
continuing obligations to one another: the employee 
to render services, the employer to pay salary. Those 
obligations continue until they are extinguished. Here, 
the termination mechanism described in the Personnel 
Manual, which the district court found to govern the 
terms of the contract between the college and its 
employee, was the sole means by which the college could 
extinguish the contractual relationship. Until it at 
least substantially complied with those procedures, its 
contractual obligation continued in force and the clock 
continued to fun on Piacitelli's right to receive his 
contract salary. Piacitelli is therefore entitled to 
recover that accrued salary, and is not limited to 
reimbursement for an injury caused by a specific wrongful 
act. 
This result comports with what we deem to be sound policy 
for contractual employer-employee relations. It will 
encourage employers to comply promptly with their contractual 
termination procedures, and if they fail to do so will 
impose the monetary consequences on the party at fault. 
If the rule were otherwise, the employer could discharge 
an employee summarily and then omit or delay the contractual 
termination procedures with impunity so long as it was in 
possession of evidence which, when ultimately provided, 
would justify the discharge. In that circumstance, the 
employee, without notice of the reason for his dismissal 
and without any opportunity to refute the charges, would 
remain in an indefinite and painful state of limbo, uncertain 
about his ultimate right to reinstatement or back pay. If 
our rule works any hardship on employers, they can avoid it 
by prompt and substantial compliance with the procedures 
to which they have agreed." (636 P. 2d at 1069, emphasis 
supplied). 
The direction of the court was clear: to protect those 
innocent employees who might be falsely accused of wrongdoing. The 
court, by following modern contract concepts, formulated a remedy 
that gives the employment contract meaning not mere illusion, and 
enforces that contract strictly, even to the point of requiring back 
pay to an employee whose discharge was defective only as to process 
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since good cause existed for the dismissal. 
In the case at bar, the plaintiffs were discharged not for 
improper performance, but because they were sacrificed as an 
example to others. The entire charade was based upon a ludricrous 
witch hunt. 
Utah is not alone in carving out exceptions to the terminable-
at-will doctrine. In fact, more than two thirds of American 
jurisdictions have abandoned the employment-at-will rule as a 
strict substantive formulation. See Perritt, Employment Dismissal 
Law & Practice, 198 5 at page 18. 
"In the past five years virtually every state court 
has had to confront whether and how to curtail an 
employer's reliance on the employment at will rule. 
Employers had relied on the rule to discharge 
employees in their absolute discretion except as 
limited by statute or contract. Now, a majority 
of jurisdictions to varying degrees have abrogated 
employment at will by recognizing causes of action 
for wrongful discharge . . . " Springer, The Wrong-
ful Discharge case, trial, June 1985 at page 38. 
These inroads are a result of the inherent unfairness of the 
traditional rule. Increasingly, the courts have been willing to 
recognize a cause of action for wrongful discharge even where the 
employment is of an indefinite duration or where the employee is 
given no special consideration other than his services. See cases 
collected at 1 & 2 Employment-at-Will Reporter (May 198 3-January 
1985). 
- i 
The employment-at-will is based on outdated assumptions and 
leads to unnecessarily harsh results. See 93 Harvard Law Review 
1816 (1980) . It is the employees who will bear the risk of malicious 
I 
and capricious firings by employers unless the courts imply a 
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contractual term allowing only good faith discharges. Such an 
approach somewhat similar to what we see in protecting consumers 
in product liability cases, will result in protecting employees 
from the financial and emotional harm brought about by employer 
abuse of discretion to terminate. 
The reporters are replete with cases limiting and confining 
the termination-at-will doctrine and I will only cite several of 
the most significant. 
In Larrabee v. Penobscot Frozen Foods, 486 A. 2d 97 (Me. 1984), 
the plaintiff asserted an implied contract existed as a result of 
writings entitled "General Policy" and "Word Rules". The defendant 
discharged the plaintiff for "misconduct". The trial court dismissed 
the cause of action on the basis that absent an allegation that the 
employment was for a particular period of time, the employment was 
terminable at will. 
The Main Supreme Court in reversing the trial judge said: 
"[5] While the employment of much of the country1s 
labor force is governed by the terminable at will 
rule, a subtantial percentage of the labor force is 
protected by collective bargaining agreements or are 
employed by federal or state governments, and can 
generally be discharged only for 'just cause1. See 
93 Harv. L. Rev. 1816, 1816 n. 1 & n. 2. There is 
no reason why individuals not otherwise given this 
protection and their employers should not be free 
to contract against discharge without good cause, 
as the plaintiffs in the instant case allege they 
did. We hold, therefore, that parties may enter into 
an employment contract terminable only pursuant to its 
express terms—as 'for cause'— by clearly stating 
their intention to do so, even though no consideration 
other than services to be performed or promised is 
expected by the employer, or is performed or promised 
by the employee. In so holding, we join several other 
courts which have carved out the identical or a similar 
exception to the terminable-at-will rule." 
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In Toussaint v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Michigan, 292 N.W. 
2d 880 (Mich. 1980), an employee was discharged without good cause 
under the employerfs policy manual which states that it was the 
company's policy to require good cause for discharge and that the 
employee had also been told that as long as he did his job well, 
he would have a job with Blue Cross. These representations the 
court concluded gave the employee a legitimate expectation of job 
security on which he could base a cause of action in contract 
for discharge. See also Weiner v. McGraw Hill, Inc., 443 N.E. 2d 
441 (New York 1983). 
In Forrester v« Parker, 606 P. 2d 191 (New Mexico 1980) the 
plaintiff maintained that the personnel policy guide controlled the 
employer-employee relationship. The trial court held it did not 
because plaintiff was an employee at will who could be discharged 
even without cause. The supreme court reversed holding that the 
policy guide constituted an implied employment contract and the 
conditions in it bound both the plaintiff and the defendant. 
In Gates v. Life of Montana Insurance Company, 638 P. 2d 1063 
(Montana 1982), the employee entered into an employment contract 
terminable at will. Later the employer promulgated a handbook of 
personnel policies establishing procedures with regard to termination. 
The court ruled: 
"If the employer has failed to follow its own policies, 
the peace of mind of its employees is shattered and 
an injustice is done. 
4]We hold that a covenant of good faith and fair dealing 
was implied in the employment contract of the appellant. 
There remains a genuine issue of material fact which 
precludes a summary judgment, i.e. whether the respondent 
failed to afford appellant the process required and if 
so, whether the respondent thereby breached the covenant 
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of good faith and fair dealing." 
In Southwest Gas Corporation v. Ahmad, 668 P. 2d 261 (Nevada 
1983), Ahmad had an oral employment contract. Subsequently, South-
west Gas issued Employee Information and Benefit Handbooks to its 
employees. The Supreme Court ruled that the handbook became part 
of the original contract and thus termination had to comply with 
the clause of the handbook relating thereto. 
In Shah v. American Synthetic Rubber Corporation, 655 S. W. 
2d 489 (Ky. 1983), Shah claimed a contract existed because of a 
policies and procedure manual. The defendant asserted that he was 
an employee for an indefinite period of time thus rendering his 
employment terminable at will. In rejecting the employerfs claim 
the court said: 
"[2] Protection of employees against discharge without 
cause is routinely provided under collective bargaining 
agreements, as well as under civil service statutes 
and ordinances. See cases and statutes collected in 
93 Harv. L. Rev. 1816, 1816, n. 1 (1980). It is there 
estimated that one-third of the entire national work force 
is afforded such protection. Employers and individual 
employees should be equally free to contract against 
discharge without cause, as Shah and ASRC are presumed 
for purposes of ASRC's motion for summary judgment to 
have done. We joint a number of other jurisdictions 
which hold that parties may enter into a contract of 
employment terminable only pursuant to its express 
terms—as 'for cause1—by clearly stating their intent-
ion to do so, even though no other considerations than 
services to be performed or promised, is expected by the 
employer, or performed or promised by the employee." 
E.g. Littell v. evening Star Newspaper Co., 120 F. 2d 
36,37 (D.C. Cir. 1941). See also Rowe v. Noren Pattern 
& Foundry Co., 91 Mich. App. 254, 283 N.W. 2d 713 (1979); 
Drzewiecki v. H & R Block, 101 Cal. Rptr. 169, 24 Cal. 
App. 3d 695 (1972) . 
In Oslerkamp v. Atkota, Mfg. Inc., 332 N.W. 2d 275 (S.D. 
198 3, the South Dakota Supreme Court ruled that the rules, regulations 
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and disciplinary procedures of the employer-employee handbook 
created a contractual right for which recovery could be had 
for wrongful discharge. A like decision was reached by the 
Minnesota Supreme Court in Pine River State Bank v. Mettile, 
333 N. W. 2d 622 (Minn. 1983): 
"[4] If the handbook language constitutes an offer, 
and the offer has been communicated by dissemination 
of the handbook to the employee, the next question is 
whether there has been an acceptance of the offer and 
consideration furnished for its enforceability. In 
the case of unilateral contracts for employment with 
knowledge of new or changed conditions, the new or 
changed conditions may become a contractual obligation. 
In this manner, an original employment contract may be 
modified or replaced by a subsequent unilateral contract. 
The employee's retention of employment constitutes 
acceptance of the offer of a unilateral contract? by 
continuing to stay on the job, although free to leave, 
the employee supplies the necessary consideration for 
the offer." 
In Vinyard v. King, 728 F. 2d 428 (10th Cir. 1984) the court 
held that where the only writing evidencing an employment contract 
was the employee handbook signed by both the employee and the 
employer that under Oklahoma law a property interest existed that 
was protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. 
In Wadeson v. American Family Mutual Insurance Company, 
343 N. W. 2d 367 (N.D. 1984) the North Dakota Statute provided: 
"34-03-01. Termination of Employment at will—Notice 
Required. An employment having no specified term may 
be terminated at the will of either party on notice 
to the other, except when otherwise provided by this 
title." 
In spite of the statute the court recognized an implied covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing in all contracts and required an employer 
to exercise good faith and fair dealing in terminating an employee. 
-16-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
The Arizona Supreme Court has adopted the Personnel Policy 
Manual exception to the termination-at-will doctrine in Wagenseller 
v. Scottsdale Memorial Hospital, 710 P. 2d 1025 (Arizona 1985) 
and Accord Leikvold v. Valley View Community Hospital, 6 88 P. 2d 
170 (Arizona 1984) . 
In the case at hand, plaintiffs were required to sign the 
Nordstrom History and Policy Regulations, Ex. P-l, T. 957-59, 1153, 
1274-75. 
Restatement, Second, Contracts Section 205 provides: 
"Every contract imposes upon each party a duty of 
good faith and fair dealing in its performance and 
its enforcement. " 
This concept is likewise recognized in Williston Contracts 
(3rd Edition §670, 1295): 
"Whenever, therefore, a contract cannot be carried 
out the way in which it was obviously expected 
that it should be carried out, without one party or 
the other performing some act not expressly promised 
by him, a promise to do that act must be implied." 
There is no compelling reason, public or otherwise to read out of an 
employment contract an implied obligation of good faith and fair 
dealing regardless of whether or not such contracts of employment 
can be terminated at will. To do so would remove the universal 
obligation of good faith which Utah law has to this point tradition-
ally read into and required in all contractual relationships, and 
thus an implied contract existed and plaintiffs were entitled to rely 
upon the procedures set forth therein and to require that the 
defendant comply with the convenant of good faith and fair dealing 
in any termination. 
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B. Utah Has Recognized an Implied Covenant of Good Faith 
and Fair Dealing and the Courts Should Apply It in 
Employment Contract Cases, 
Utah has recognized that an implied covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing is inherent in every contract entered into 
in this state. Beck v. Farmer's Insurance Exchange, 701 P. 2d 795, 
(Utah 1985); Leigh Furniture and Carpet Co. v. Isom, 657 P. 2d 
293 (Utah 1982); Prince v. Elm Company, Inc., 649 P. 2d 820 (Utah 
1982) ; W. P. Harlin Construction Co. v. Utah State Road Commission, 
431 P. 2d 792 (Utah 1967). 
In this case plaintiffs were merely asserting their rights 
under Utah law with specific reference to the covenant of good faith 
and fair dealing implied by the law in all contractual relationships. 
Appellant in Point I B asserts that a majority of states have 
rejected a bad faith exception to the at-will rule. Such is not 
the case and in fact a majority of states have embraced the good 
faith and fair dealing concept as pointed out in the numerous 
citations above. Appellant asserts only public policy demands can 
justify good faith and fair dealing requirements. However, the 
cases cited herein make it clear that it is a contractual obligation 
to terminate only in good faith and with fair dealing. 
Appellant also asserts that any change in the at-will rule 
should be made by the legislature. I am compelled to note at this 
point that in Utah the at-will doctrine, as it exists, is a court 
created doctrine and since the court possesses the legitimate 
heritage of common law innovation that developes new principles 
i 
to accomodate changina values as discussed by Holms in the Common 
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Law, and since the courts created the at-will rule, it is entirely 
appropriate for the courts to modify or eliminate it. 
There was ample and sufficient evidence to justify the 
jury's verdict. As pointed out in the statement of facts and 
the citations to the record therein, defendants so-called investi-
gation can best be characterized as one based on rumor, hearsay, 
innuendo and suspicion. The testimony of Betsey Sanders probably 
characterizes the investigation best: 
"If one person came to me it would be rumor. If some— 
if a couple of people came, that would certainly begin 
to be enough evidence that we probably had something 
definite, and if several people were telling the same 
story could be enough to get people fired." T. 196 0 
Appellant asserts that the issue of good faith and fair 
dealing was never raised in the pleadings. However, counsel cites 
the amended complaints of the Knapps and Ms. Brehany in this brief, 
page 33, wherein the plaintiffs allege that the defendant "breached 
its duty of good faith in that plaintiffs were wrongfully discharged." 
R. C82-5828, 108 and R. C82-5860, 4-5, 12. In addition, plaintiffs1 
trial memorandum filed on January 18, 1985 clearly established good 
faith and fair dealing as a theory plaintiffs were relying upon. 
The appellant is struggling to find reversible error. 
The remaining issues raised in appellant's brief are without 
merit and are not sustained by the state of the record and the 
evidence presented in this case and should be summarily rejected. 
POINT II 
THE DISTRICT COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN PARTIALLY DISMISSING 
PLAINTIFFS' CLAIM OF BREACH OF CONTRACT AND THE SUPREME 
COURT SHOULD REVERSE AND REMAND THIS CASE FOR FURTHER 
TRIAL ON SUCH CLAIM. 
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It is well settled that an implied covenant in a contract 
is just as binding as one that is express. See, for example, the 
opinion of Justice Cardozo, in Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon, 2 22 
N. Y. 88, 118 N. E. 214 (1917) It is equally accepted that: 
"Every contract imposes upon each party a duty of 
good faith and fair dealing in its performance and 
its enforcement." (Restatement Second of Contracts 
§231) 
17 Am. Jur. 2d 653, Contracts §256 states: 
"Every contract implies good faith and iair dealing 
between the parties to it, and a duty of cooperation 
on the part of both parties. Moreover, there is an 
implied undertaking in every contract on the part of 
each party that he will not intentionally and purpose-
ly do anything to prevent the other party from carry-
ing out his part of the agreement, or do anything which 
will have the effect of destroying or injuring the 
right of the other party to receive the fruits of the 
contract. Ordinarily if one exacts a promise from 
another to perform an act, the law implies a counter-
promise against arbitrary or unreasonable conduct on 
the part of the promisee." 
Numerous reported cases apply this rule to cases involving 
employment contracts, including those involving so-called "at-
will" employees. See for example, Smithers v. MGM Studios, Inc., 
189 Cal. Rptr. 20 (1983), a formal written contract, with implied 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing; Pugh v. See's Candies, 
Inc./ 116 Cal. App. 3d 311, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917 (1981), a contract 
of employment for indefinite duration, with implied covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing, and implied agreement that the employee 
would be terminated only for good cause; Cancellier v. Federated 
Department Stores, 672 F. 2d 1312 (9th Cir. 1982), applying 
California law, finding an implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing in an employment contract; Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 316 A. 
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2d 549 (N. H. 1974), employment at-will, terminated by employer 
in bad faith, constitutes a breach of the employment contract; 
and Fortune v. N.CR. Co. , 364 N.E. 2d 1251 (Mass. 1977) finding 
an implied covenant of good faith in employment contract that 
was terminable-at-will. 
Numerous cases have found implied covenants do not discharge 
an employee except for good cause. See for example, Pugh v. See1s 
Candies, Inc., supra,; Cleary v. American Airlines, Inc., Ill Cal. 
App. 3d 443, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722 (1980), employment contract, 
terminable-at-will has implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing 
and employer is estopped to discharge employee without good cause; 
Novosel v. Nationwide Insurance Co., 721 F. 2d 894 (3rd Cir. 1983) 
applying law of Pennsylvania, finding employee's custom, practice 
or policy can create contracual requirements of just cause, or 
contractual procedures, which an employer must abide by to discharge 
an employee; and Toussaint v. Blue Cross and Shield of Michigan, 
supra. 
Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, supra, is typical 
holding, inter alia, that: 
"1) a provision of an employment contract providing that 
an employee shall not be discharged except for cause 
is legally enforceable although the contract is not 
;
 for a definite term—the term is 'indefinite1, and 
2) such a provision may become part of the contract 
either by express agreement, oral or written, or as 
a result of an employee's legitimate expectations 
grounded in an employer's policy statements. 
*** 
4) a jury could also find for a wrongfully discharged 
employee based on legitimate expectations grounded 
in his employer's written policy statements set forth 
in the manual of personnel policies." (292 N.W. 2d at 
885. 
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While some cases have held that employment handbooks are not 
a part of an employment contract, there is a large body of well-
reasoned cases in accord with Toussaint v. Blue Cross and Blue 
Shield, supra, including Conley v. Board of Trustees, 707 F. 2d 
175 (5th Cir. 1983), Mississippi law, employerfs guidebook containing 
rules adopted pursuant to expressly granted authority from the 
legislature, created a constitutionally protected claim to continued 
employment; Greene v. Howard University, 412 F. 2d 1128 (D. C. 
Cir. 1969), faculty handbook created contractual obligation, not-
withstanding purported disclaimer; Forrester v. Parker, supra, 
personnel policy guide constituted implied employment contract arising 
as a result of parties conduct; Yartzoff v. Democrat-Herald Publish-
ing Co., 281 Ore. 651, 576 P. 2d 356 (1978), no summary judgment 
where issue of fact existed as to whether provisions in employee 
handbook were intended to be part of original contract for employment 
and that contract allowed termination only for good cause; Walker 
v. Northern San Diego County Hospital District, 135 Cal. App. 3d 
896, 185 Cal. Rptr. 617 (1982), error to direct verdict for employer 
where issues existed as to whether employee had a written or oral 
i 
or implied in fact agreement that she would be terminated only for 
cause; Southwest Gas Corporation v. Ahmad, supra, holding that parties 
were contractually bound by termination clause in employee handbook; 
( 
and Weiner v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., supra. 
In Weiner v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., supra, an employee sued for 
wrongful termination. The employer's motion to dismiss was denied 
by the trial court. The employer appealed to the appellate division, 
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which reversed. Appeal was then taken to the Court of Appeals, 
which reinstated the trial court's ruling. 
The court of appeals in Weiner noted that although the 
plaintiff's employment was for an indefinite term of duration, 
he still could state a cause of action for breach of contract on 
the ground that he was discharged without "just and sufficient 
cause", or the rehabilitative efforts specified in the employer's 
personnel handbook. The court stated: 
"Turning now to substance, it is also clear that 
the fact that plaintiff was free to quit his employ-
ment at will, standing by itself, was not entitled 
to conclusory effect. Such a position proceeds on 
the oversimplified premise that, since the plaintiff 
was not bound to stay on, the agreement for his 
employment lacked 'mutuality1, thus leaving the 
defendant free to terminate at its pleasure. But 
this would lead to the not uncommon analytical 
error of engaging in a search for 'mutuality1, which 
is not always essential to a binding contract, rather 
than of seeking to determine the presence of consider-
ation, which is a fundamental requisite. For, while 
co-extensive promise may constitute consideration for 
each other, 'mutuality' in the sense of requiring 
such reciprocity, is not necessary when a promisor 
receives other valid consideration." (44 3 N.E. 2d at 
p. 444, citations omitted) 
The court continued: 
"As to consideration, any basic contemporary definition 
would include the idea that it consists of either a 
benefit to the promisor or a detriment to the promisee. 
As elaborated in Hamer v. Sidway, the seminal case on the 
subject, '[i]t is enough that something is promised, done, 
forborne or suffered by the party to whom the promise is 
made as consideration for the promise made to him' (citation 
omitted) 
Far from consideration needing to be coextensive or 
even proportionate, the value or measurability of the 
thing forborne or promised is not crucial so long as 
it is acceptable to the promisee. Thus, courts have 
not hesitated to find sufficient consideration not only 
in what is now the proverbial peppercorn but in 'a horse 
or a canary, or a tomtit if [the promisee] chose'. In 
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fact, the detriment suffered or the thing promised 
need be of no benefit to the one who agreed to it. 
So, in Hamer what the plaintiff 'suffered1 was 
self-denial of liquor and tobacco, a sacrifice which 
prompted our court, quoting from Anson's Principles 
of Contracts (at page 6 3), to explain that it would 
'not ask whether the thing which forms the consider-
ation does in fact benefit the promisee or a third 
party, or is of any substantial value to anyone,' 
(citations omitted) 
Apt too in the circumstances before as now is the 
following comment by Corbin: [I]f the employer 
made a promise, either express or implied, not only 
to pay for the service but also that the employment 
should continue for a period of time that is either 
definite or capable of being determined, that employ-
ment is not terminable by him 'at will' after the 
employee has begun or rendered some of the requested 
service or has given any other consideration... this 
is true even though the employee has made no return 
promise and has retained the power and legal privilege 
of termination of the employment 'at will'. The 
employer's promise is supported by the service that 
has been begun or rendered or by the other executed 
consideration. (1A Corbi, Contracts, Section 152, page 
14). So understood, an agreement on the part of an 
employer not to dismiss an employee except for 'good 
and sufficient cause only' and, if such cause was 
given, until the prescribed procedures to rehabilitate 
had failed, does not create an ineluctable employment 
at will." (443 N.E. 2d at 444-445) 
The court of appeals found the facts of the case presented 
a question for trial as to whether or not the employer was bound to 
a contract to not discharge its employer without just and sufficient 
cause, and an opportunity for rehabilitation. 
Finally, the court noted that Martin v. N.Y. Life Insurance 
Co., 148 N.Y. 117, 42 N.E. 416 (1895) . . . 
" . . . itself, when, in 1895, it adopted New York's 
at-will rule, afforded it no greater status than that 
of a rebuttable presumption (citations omitted)[if no 
definite term is fixed by contract, a hiring at will is 
deemed to have resulted only 'in the absence of circum-
stances showing a different intention']. In determining 
whether such a presumption is overcome here the trier of 
the facts will have to consider the 'course of conduct' 
of the parties, 'including their writings' (citations 
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omitted) and their antecedent negotiations. More-
over, as Brown suggests it is not McGraw's subjective 
intent, nor 'any single act, phrase or other expression' 
but the 'totality of all of these, given the attendant 
circumstances, the situation of the parties, and the 
objectives they were striving to attain', which will 
control." (443 P. 2d at p. 446, citations omitted) 
The fact that Nordstrom offered a profit sharing plan,. 
See Ex P-l, is still more evidence of an implied covenant to not 
discharge except for good cause, in good faith. By holding out this 
plan, in their employee handbook as "One of the Most Important 
Benefits Nordstrom Has For Its Employees" (original emphasis), 
and setting up the plan so that the benefits are "divided proportion-
ately among the employees according to their earnings and their years 
in the plan" (emphasis added), Nordstrom could only have intended 
to convey to its employees that their employment was secure, so long 
as they performed their jobs well. 
Indeed, the pamphlet states, in the Profit Sharing Section 
(page 19): 
" . . . the more efficiently you work and the less time 
you waste, the greater the company's profits and the 
greater your share becomes. . ." 
To allow dismissal without cause or good faith would render 
the Profit Sharing Plan an illusion and a nullity. See Cain v. 
Allen Electric & Equipment Co., 346 Mich. 568, 78 N.W. 2d 296 
(1956); Psutka v. Michigan Alkali Co., 274 Mich. 318, 264 N.W. 
385 (1936); Gaydos v. White Motor Corp., 54 Mich. App. 143, 220 
N.W. 2d 697 (1974); Clarke v. Brunswick Corp., 48 Mich. App. 667, 
211 N.W. 2d 101 (1973); Couch v. Administrative Committee of the 
Diffco Laboratories, Inc., Salaried Employees Profit Sharing 
Trust, 44, 205 N.W. 2d 24 (1972); and Haney v. Lamb, 312 A. 2d 
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330 (Del. 1973). 
All of the foregoing is consistent with the theory of 
contracts expressed in Corbin on Contracts, One Volume Edition, 
§18. 
"§18. Express and Implied Contracts. , 
Contractual duty is imposed by reason of a 
promissory expression. As to this, there is no 
difference between an express contract and an 
implied contract; all contracts are express contracts. 
But there are different modes of expressing assent. 
Expression may be by the tongue, the eye, the hand, 
or by all of them at once. It may be by language, 
by words written or spoken. Yet there is also "sign 
language" which may consist of signs that are mere 
translations from a language of words, or of signs 
that convey ideas independently of any word language. 
A contract made by sign language is an express contract. 
The language used to express assent, whether of 
words or other other signs and symbols, may be one 
invented by the parties themselves for their own private 
communications, or indeed for one communication only. 
They may use code words instead of English words, their 
own code, or the Morse code or the Western Union tele-
graphic code. They may twist ordinary English words 
into code words, so that man signifies dog and tree 
signifies a thousand bushels of wheat. A contract made 
by a code communication is an express contract. Throw-
ing up one's hat is usually an expression of joy; but 
it may be made to express assent to an agreement to sell 
land for ten thousand dollars. 
From the above, it appears also that all contracts 
are implied contracts; for the meaning to be given to any 
and all of these modes of expression is found by a process 
of implication and inference. There are implications in 
English words as well as in other signs and symbols; and 
what your words imply is also what your words express. 
Assent may be expressed by acts that have no antecedent 
agreed meaning, although no meaning can be attributed to 
them except in relation to the previous usage and conduct 
of men. The inference to be drawn from the acts is 
determined by what the actor and other men have used them 
to express. 
The distinction between an express and an implied 
contract, therefore, is of little importance, if it can be 
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said to exist at all. The matter that is of import-
ance , is the degree of effectiveness of the expression 
used. Clarity of expression determines the reasonable-
ness of understanding and eases the court's problems 
in case of dispute. The character of the evidence to 
be presented to the court depends upon the mode of 
expression used: and the more variant and obscure the 
mode, the more difficult the court's problem. No 
where is accomplished artistry worth more than in the 
drafting of an important contract. It may be an 
exaggeration to say that nowhere is it less often to 
be found. Where an expression of agreement is put into 
words that are frequently used with more than one 
meaning, it is difficult, and sometimes impossible 
to decide that an express contract exists. Likewise, 
when conduct other than words is such as persons 
frequently perform with different meanings, it is 
difficult, and sometime impossible, to decide that an 
implied contract exists. 
It is now well understood that a contract may be 
unilateral; that is, that only one of the parties makes 
a promise, the consideration for which is sortie non-
promissory performance rendered by the other or for 
which no consideration is necessary. In such cases, it 
is nearly always the promisor who makes an offer of his 
promise and requests action or forbearance in return. 
If such is the offer that has been made a promise that 
he will render the requested performance. Generally, 
therefore, the implication of a return promise is 
directly bound up with the interpretation of the terms 
of the offer. If the offeror has not asked for a promise, 
the normal result is that he doesnft get one; but if the 
offeror does ask for a promise and the conduct of the 
offeree makes him believe reasonably that the requested 
promise has been made, the court will generally find that 
it has been made, by implication if not expressly. This 
will be true, whether the plaintiff is trying to prove 
that the defendant made such an implied promise in order 
to maintain action for its enforcement, or whether the 
plaintiff is trying to show that he himself made such an 
implied promise in order to establish a consideration for the 
express promise of the defendant. 
Parties who have made an express contract to be in 
effect for one year (or any other stated time) frequently 
proceed with performance after expiration of the year 
without making any new express agreement, of extension or 
otherwise. From such continued action a court may infer 
that the parties have agreed in fact to renew the one-year 
contract for another similar period. Illustrations can be 
found in leaseholds, employment transactions, and contract 
for a continuing supply of some commodity." (citation ommitted). 
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Applying the Corbin reasoning to the totality of facts and 
circumstances in the case at bar, it is clear that an employment 
contract existed between plaintiffs and Nordstrom, and, as a part 
of that contract, there existed a covenant that plaintiffs would be 
secure in their positions, and subject to discharge only for good 
cause, and in good faith. This covenant was grossly breached by 
Nordstrom.
 v 
Plaintiffs herewith incorporate the argument and cases cited 
in Point I, supra. Finally, the facts of the instant case, and 
the statements and acts of Nordstrom, amount to circumstances which 
any reasonable, objective person seeking employment, or one already 
employed, would construe as a promise of job security, and a promise 
that one would not be dismissed except for cause and in good faith. 
Nordstrom must certainly have reasonably expected that its 
statements and acts would lead employees and potential employees 
to believe they were promised job security; indeed they must have 
intended such a construction, and further intended that such a 
construction (i.e. job security, no dismissal without case, in 
good faith) would induce employees to work for their corporation. 
Under such circumstances as here, when injustice can only be 
avoided by the enforcement of the promise, the principles behind the 
doctrine of promissory estoppel mandate that the promise be enforced. 
See Restatements of Contracts, Second, §90. 
POINT III 
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING PLAINTIFFS1 CLAIM 
OF DEFAMATION AND THE SUPREME COURT SHOULD REVERSE AND 
REMAND THIS CASE FOR FURTHER TRIAL ON SUCH CLAIM. 
-28-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
The facts herein present for the court a straight-forward 
defamation case. Defendant, through its agents, made defamatory 
statements in the nature of accusations of criminal conduct that 
resulted in plaintiffs being injured.. T. 1140, 133, 1337-38, 
1358, 1360, 1367, 1372-77, 1392, 1399, 1403-1407. Defendants argued 
and the court in dismissing plaintiffs' claim adopted the defense 
of qualified privilege. 
While such doctrine is recognized in Utah, Combs v.. Montgomery 
Ward and Co., 288 P. 2d 272 (1951); Ogden Bus Lines v. KSL, Inc., 
551 P. 2d 222 (1976); Lind v. Lynch, 665 P. 2d 1276 (1983), no 
cases exist which deal specifically with the facts presented by 
this case, that is the accusation of a crime involving drugs or 
narcotics. 
Professor Prosser in Handbook on the Law of Torts, 4th Ed. 
1971 succinctly discusses the law of qualified privilege. On page 
785 he sets forth six (6) categories of interest protected by a 
qualified privilege. 
"1. Interest of Publisher. Roughly similar to the 
privileges of self-defense or the defense of 
property is the privilege which attaches to 
the publication of defamatory matter for the 
protection or advancement of the defendant's 
own legitimate interests. Thus, he may publish 
in an appropriate manner, anything which reason-
ably appears to be necessary to defend his own 
reputation against the defamation of another, 
including, of course, the allegation that his 
accuser is an unmitigated liar and the truth is 
not in him." 
"2. Interest of Others. The privilege to use force 
to protect the safety of another finds a general 
parallel in the privilege to publish defamation 
for the protection of the interests of persons 
other than the publisher . . . As in the case 
of the use of force, the defendant must have 
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reason to believe that the publication is necessary 
:f, for the purpose, and that the other is unable to 
protect himself." 
"3. Common Interest. A conditional privilege is recog-
nized in many cases where the publisher and the 
recipient have a common interest, and the communic-
ation is of a kind reasonably calculated to protect 
or further it. . . . This is most obvious, of course, 
in the case of those who have entered upon or are 
considering business dealings with one another, or 
where the parties are members of a group with a common 
pecuniary interest, as where officers, agents or 
employees of a business organization communicate 
with stockholders, or with other employees or branch 
offices about the affairs of the organization itself, 
or taxpayers discuss the management of public funds, 
or an association of property owners the desirability 
of a prospective purchaser, or creditors the affairs 
of a common debtor. . . . The privilege has also been 
extended to the members of groups with a common interest 
of a non-pecuniary character, such as religious or 
professional societies, fraternal, social or education-
al organizations, families or labor unions, if the 
matter communicated is pertinent to the interest of the 
group. In all such cases, however, the privilege is 
lost, if the defamation goes beyond the group interest, 
or if the publication is made to persons who have no 
reason to receive the information." 
"4. Communication to One Who May Act in the Public Interest. 
The interest of the general public as distinguished 
from that of any individual has given rise to two 
qualified privileges, which often has been confused. 
. . . The first sometimes called the 'public interest1 
privilege, involves communications made to those who 
may be expected to take official action of some kind 
for the protection of some interest of the public. -
It is on this basis that communications from one public 
officer to another in an effort to discharge official 
duty are held to be at least qualifiedly privileged. 
. . . But private citizens likewise are privileged to 
give information to proper authorities for the prevent-
ion or detection of crime, or to complain to them 
about the conduct of public officials and seek their 
removal from office." 
"5. Fair Comment on Matters of Public Concern." 
"6. Reports of Public Proceedings." 
Professor Prosser after recognizing and describing the 
categories of Qualified Privilege points out that such conditional 
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"Abuse of Qualified Privilege. The condition 
attached to all such qualified privileges is 
that they must be exercised in a reasonable 
manner and for a proper purpose. The immunity 
is forfeited if the defendant steps outside 
of the scope of the privilege, or abuses the 
occasion. Thus qualified privilege does not 
extend, in any of the above cases, to the pub-
lication of irrelevant defamatory matter with no 
bearing upon the public or private interest which 
is entitled to protection; nor does it include 
publication to any person other than those whose 
hearing of it is reasonably believed to be 
necessary or useful for the futherance of that 
interest. ... Furthermore, the qualified privilege 
will be lost if the defendant publishes the 
defamation in the wrong state of mind. The word 
'malice', which has plagued the law of defamation 
from the beginning, has been much used in this 
connection, and it frequently is said that the 
privilege is forfeited if the publication is 
!maliciousf. ... Perhaps the statement which best 
fits the decided cases is that the court will 
look to the primary motive or purpose by which the 
defendant apparently is inspired. Discarding 'malice' 
as a meaningless and quite unsatisfactory term, 
it appears that the privilege is lost if the publi-
cation is not made primarily for the purpose of 
furthering the interest which is entitled to pro-
tection." ... Finally, since there is not social 
advantage in the publication of a deliberate lie, 
the privilege is lost if the defendant does not 
believe what he says. Many courts have gone 
further, and have said that it is lost if the 
defamer does not have reasonable grounds, or 
'probable cause' to believe it to be true. ... 
Probably the best statement of the rule is that 
the defendant is required to act as a reasonable 
man under the circumstances, with due regard to 
the strength of his belief, the grounds that he 
has to support it, and the importance of conveying 
the information." 
With respect to burden of proof Professor Prosser 
says: 
"Burden of Proof-Court and Jury. The burden is 
upon the defendant in the first instance to establish 
existence of a privileged occasion for the publication, 
by proof of a recognized public or private interest 
which would justify the utterance of the words. 
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Whether the occasion was a privileged one, is 
a question to be determined by the court as 
an issue of law, unless of course the facts 
are in dispute, in which case the jury will be 
instructed as to the proper rules to apply. Once 
the existence of the privilege is established, 
the burden is upon the plaintiff to prove that it 
has been abused by excessive publication, by use 
of the occasion for an improper purpose, or by 
lack of belief or grounds for belief in the 
truth of what is said." 
Two Utah cases cited previously as recognizing the doctrine 
of conditional privilege must each be viewed from their oarticular 
factual settings. Combs v. Montgomery Ward & Co., supra, involved 
an agent of defendant interviewing fellow employees about missing 
money and plaintifffs reputation for honesty. After the interviews 
and at the end of the day, plaintiff was terminated. Ke sued 
alleging defamation. At trial the court directed a verdict for 
the defendant on the grounds that: (1) the statements were 
privileged and (2) that there was no evidence of actual malice 
so as to remove tne privilege. The Supreme Court affirmed the 
findings of conditional privilege citing the law of torts, Sec. 
594, p. 242: 
"An occasion is conditionally privileged when 
the circumstances induce a correct or reason-
able belief that: 
(a) facts exist which affect a sufficiently 
important interest of the publisher, and 
(b) the recipients knowledge of the 
defamatory matter will be of service in the 
lawful protection of the interest." 
The court further stated: ! 
"... any communication between employer and 
employee is protected by this privilege, 
provided it is made bona fide about something 
in which (1) the speaker or writer has an 
interest or duty; (2) the hearer or person • 
addressed has a corresponding interest or Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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duty; and provided (3) the statement is made 
in protection of that interest or in the per-
formance of that duty. There must also be an 
honest belief in the truth of the statement." 
The court went on to discuss the limited category of person 
with whom proper inquiry, under a conditional privilege 
might be made: 
"As indicated in the foregoing quotation, for 
the purpose of safeguarding against too wide-
spread, careless or ill-advised inquiry under 
the protection of the cloak of conditional 
privilege, the law reuqires that there also be 
a proper interest on the part of the one to 
whom the inquiry is made. This subject is cover-
ed under the comments of (g) and (h) on clause 
(b) of the Rule 594 from the Restatement of 
Torts referred to above: 
(g) Under the rule stated ... it is further 
necessary that the publication be made to a 
person, who if the defamatory matter be true, 
may reasonably be expected to be of service 
in the protection of the interest. 
(h) . . . an owner of property may communicate 
his reasonable belief that it is in danger of 
theft or harm to his employee or a police officer 
since such persons have a legal duty to assist 
him in the protection of his property interests." 
The court concluded from the facts shown that inquiry of the 
fellow employees was necessary to determine what had become 
of the money since each fellow employee had access to it. " 
The court further concluded that the employees either had or 
should have had an interest in protecting employers property 
thus finding a commonality of interest which would sustain a 
conditional privilege. This case may be described by Professor 
Prosser as a case falling within category three, Common Interest. 
Ogden Bus Lines v. KSL, Inc., supra dealt with 
an editorial wherein the defendant KSL reported that the 
plaintiff had been charged with driving on a revoked license. 
-33-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
The court adopted the conditional privilege rule as follows: 
"It is firmly established that matters of 
public interest and concern are legitimate 
subjects of fair comment and criticism, not 
only in newspapers and in radio and television 
broadcasts, but by members of the public 
generally, and such comments and criticisms 
are not actionable, however severe in their 
terms, unless they are made maliciously..." 
This case falls within Professor Prossers category four. 
Lind v. Lynch was a case where stockholders in 
a corporation mailed to other stockholders in the corporation 
copies of a complaint filed against the plaintiff in a federal 
court. The court in affirming summary judgment said: 
"It has long been held that communications 
between persons who share a common business 
interest are qualifiedly privileged and not 
libelous in the absence of malice." 
This case falls within Professor Prosser's category three. 
In looking at the facts presented by the case here 
before the court we must ask which of the categories of Qualified 
Privilege can this case be araued to fall within. It can only 
be argued to fall within category three, Common Interest. 
What common interest, if any, can there be said to exist between 
the defendants in this case and their employees so far as the statemen 
that plaintiffs are involved in drugs or narcotics is concerned? 
Obviously, there is no common interest. The only interest served 
by the publication of the statements was self interests of the < 
defendants. A case almost identical on its facts to this case 
is Haddad v. Sears Roebuck and Co., 526 F. 2d 83 (6th Circuit 1976). 
In that case plaintiff was accused of gambling and allowing < 
others to gamble on company property and of falsifying company 
records. After his firing, employees who had been supervised 
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by plaintiff asked for a meeting with the store manager. 
The manager told the employees that the plaintiff has been 
discharged for gambling and allowing gambling and for 
falsification of company records. The jury returned a verdict 
for $37,000 for plaintiff. On aopeal it was asserted the trial 
court erred by not finding the statements to fall within a 
qualified privilege. The court in denying a qualified privilege 
cited two previous Michigan cases, Bostetter v. Kirsch Co., 
319 Mich. 547, 30 N.W. 2d 276 (1948) and Sais v. General Motors, 
372 Mich. 542, 127 N. W. 2d 357 (1964) as follows: 
"Qualified privilege exists in a much larger 
number of cases. It extends to all communications 
made bona fide upon any subject matter in which 
the party communicating has an interest, or in 
reference to which he has a duty, to a person having 
a corresponding interest or duty. And the privilege 
embraces cases where the duty is not a legal one, 
but where it is of a moral or social character of 
imperfect obligation." 
"On the question of the publication of the 
statement we hold that in calling in fellow 
employees of plaintiff and Explaining1 the 
circumstances of his separation, defendant 
corporation was serving its own particular 
interest. That interest, as described by 
defendant's representatives was to restore 
morale in the plant protection force and 
to quiet rumors that were circulating among 
its members, adversely affecting the company." 
"The question of application of qualified 
privilege in a situation like this involving 
communications to fellow employees (particularly 
where the plaintiff has been a supervisor and 
his former subordinates Have sought information 
about his discharge) is not an easy one." 
It is submitted that the facts of Haddad v. Sears 
Roebuck & Co., supra, are on all fours with the facts before 
this court. 
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The allegations here are drugs, in that gambling. The communi-
cation in both cases was to employees of one in a supervisory 
capacity. No common interest exists such as the protection 
of company money as was seen in Comb s v. Montgomery Ward & 
Co., supra. No common interest exists such as among stockholders 
as was seen in Lind v. Lynch, supra. The publication herein 
tended to serve only the particular interests of the defendants 
and none other. 
As a result the Qualified Privilege cannot be said 
to exist. See Drennen v. Westinghouse Electric Corporation, 
328 Southern 2d 52 (1976). 
Even if a Qualified Privilege were found to have 
existed it must be deemed to have been lost because of abuse 
as previously discussed by Professor Prosser, see abuse of 
Qualified Privilege supra. 
In Dillard Department Stores v. Felton, 6 34 S. W. 
2d 135 (1982) a Dillard security guard observed a box of 
merchandise in Felton1s car. Felton was called to the office 
of the supervisor and there he was accused of being a thief 
and a liar. Felton walked out of the meeting. He told a 
fellow employee that he had been accused of taking some things. 
When the supervisor came out of the office the fellow employee asked 
.*what had happened and the supervisor said Felton had been 
fired because he had been caught stealing. The :jury awarded 
damages arid the company appealed arguing that they had not 
exceeded the qualified privilege existing under the law. In 
discussing this issue the court cited the Restatement (Second) 
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of Torts §595 (1981)). 
"(1) An occasion makes a publication conditionally 
privileged if the circumstances induce a correct 
or reasonble belief that 
(a) there is information that affects a 
sufficiently important interest of the 
recipient or a third person and, 
(b) the recipient is one to whom the 
publisher is under a legal duty to publish 
the defamatory matter or is a person to whom 
its publication is otherwise within the 
generally accepted standards of decent conduct. 
(2) In determining whether a publication is within 
the generally accented standards of decent conduct 
it is an important factor that 
(a) The publication is made in response to 
a request rather than volunteered by the publisher 
or 
(b) a family or other relationship exists 
between the parties." 
In affirming the award of the jury the court went on to say: 
"One important condition attaches to the qualified 
privilege, such communications must be exercised in 
a reasonable manner and for a proper purpose. The 
immunity does not protect a defendant from publication 
to persons other than those whose hearing is reason-
ably believed to be necessary or useful for the 
furtherance of that interest." 
The court found that the communication to Felton by the supervisor 
in his office was protected as a qualified privilege but further 
found that the statement to fellow employees that Felton had been 
fired because he was caught stealing exceeded the privilege 
afforded by law. 
"Since we find no legitimate interest necessitating 
Martin's statement and find it to have been factually 
inaccurate at the expense of appellee's reputation, 
we think it excessive and therefore supportive of 
the award of compensatory damages." 
"The protection of the privilege may be lost by 
the manner of its exercise, although the belief 
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in the truth of the charge exists. The privilege 
does not protect any unnecessary defamation. In 
order for a communication to be privileged, the 
party making it must be careful to go no farther 
than his interest or his duties require. Where the 
party exceeds his privilege and the communication 
complained of goes beyond what the occasion demands 
that he should publish, and is unnecessarily defamatory 
of plaintiff, he will not be protected, and the fact 
that a duty, a common interest or a confidential 
relation existed to a limited degree is not a defense, 
even though he acted in good faith." 
The findings of this case are applicable in the case 
before this court. There was no legitimate interest necessitating 
the statement of defendants that plaintiffs were terminated for 
involvement in drugs or narcotics. The defendants exceeded any 
privilege which may have existed and they published unnecessarily 
defamatory statements and by doing so lost that privilege. Had the 
defendants stated that plaintiffs were under investigation for 
drugs they would have been on safer ground but such is not the 
case and the privilege, if any, must be deemed waived. 
Should the court by chance find that a qualified 
privilege exists there is sufficient evidence of actual malice ( 
to permit this case to be decided by the jury. 
Two Utah cases have dealt with the malice that must be 
shown to overcome a conditional privilege. Ogden Bus Lines, < 
supra at page 225 provides: 
"The malice which plaintiff must show in order 
to overcome a conditional privilege is simply 
,. an improper motive such as a desire to do i 
harm or that the defendant did not honestly 
believe his statements to be true or that the 
publication was excessive." 
"The question of whether a qualifiedly 
privileged article is written or published 
with malicious motive or otherwise is generally 
speaking, a question of fact to be determined 
by the jury." 
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See also Seegmiller v. KSL, Inc., 626 P. 968 (1981) at 
page 975. 
The United States Supreme Court has also spoken on the 
issue of what must be shown to overcome a qualified privilege 
and have stated that publications subject to a qualified privilege 
are actionable only upon a showing that they were made with knowledge 
that they were false or with reckless disregard of whether they were 
false or not. New York Times v. Sullivat, 376 U.S. 254 at p. 280, 
84 S. Ct. 710 at p. 726, 11 L. Ed. 2d 686. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated above, this court should affirm the 
jury verdict in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendant; 
the court should deny a remittitur and deny the granting of a new 
trial. The court should reverse and remand for trial that portion 
of the District Court's judgment partially dismissing plaintiffs' 
claim for breach of contract and should likewise reverse and 
remand for trial that portion of the District Court's judgment 
dismissing plaintiffs' claims for defamation. 
DATED this 5th day of May, 1986. 
/s/ 
/ D^/GILBERT ATHAY 
/ Lawyer for Respondents-Cross 
Appellants 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that four copies of the foregoing Brief 
of Respondents was delivered to Mr. Stephen J. Hill, SNOW, 
CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU, attorneys for appellant, 10 Exchange 
Place, Eleventh Floor, Salt Lake City, Utah 8 4110 th&g^ day 
of May, 1986. 
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